"This site requires JavaScript to work correctly"
minimize Header

Prof. Dr. Marcus Dittrich

Professor of Applied Microeconomics

Faculty of Applied Economics (School of Management)

Professors

Professor

ITC2 2.43b

0991/3615-124

Sortierung:
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • G. Markwardt

Zu kurz gedacht? Die Lkw-Maut - Ein (ungenutztes) Lenkungsinstrument auf dem Prüfstand.

In: ifo Dresden berichtet pg. 43-50

  • (2003)
Contribution
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • B. Grundig
  • G. Markwardt
  • C. Pohl
  • H. Schmalholz
  • M. Thum

Der sächsische Arbeitsmarkt vor dem Hintergrund demographischer Veränderungen.

In: Die demographische Herausforderung. Sachsens Zukunft gestalten pg. 121-140

  • Eds.:
  • G. Milbradt
  • J. Meier

Verlag Bertelsmann-Stiftung Gütersloh

  • (2004)
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich

Die Auswirkungen des demographischen Wandels auf den Arbeitsmarkt.

In: CWG-Dialog pg. 1-4

  • (2004)
Book
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • W. Gerstenberger
  • B. Grundig
  • G. Markwardt
  • C. Pohl
  • H. Schmalholz
  • M. Thum

Demographische Entwicklung im Freistaat Sachsen. Analyse und Strategien zum Bevölkerungsrückgang auf dem Arbeitsmarkt.

In: ifo Dresden Studien vol. Band 36

ifo-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung München

  • (2004)
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • G. Markwardt

Arbeitslosigkeit und Kriminalität: Eine mögliche "Doppelte Dividende" der Arbeitsmarktpolitik?.

In: ifo Dresden berichtet pg. 11-17

  • (2004)
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • G. Markwardt
  • M. Thum

Die Examensklausur aus der Volkswirtschaftslehre.

In: wisu - das wirtschaftsstudium pg. 1106-1111

  • (2004)
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • G. Markwardt
  • M. Thum

Altersstruktureffekte auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt.

In: Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der TU Dresden vol. 54 pg. 76-80

  • (2005)
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • G. Markwardt
  • M. Thum

Die Examensklausur aus der Volkswirtschaftslehre.

In: wisu - das wirtschaftsstudium pg. 840-845

  • (2007)
Book
  • Marcus Dittrich

Kollektive Verhandlungen in Arbeitsmärkten. Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde.

In: Hochschulschriften vol. Band 119

Metropolis Marburg

  • (2008)

show abstract

Verhandlungssituationen zwischen Arbeitgebern und Arbeitnehmern stellen ein wichtiges Anwendungsfeld der ökonomischen Theorie der Verhandlungen dar. Unter Ökonomen herrscht dabei weitestgehend Übereinstimmung über die These, dass solche kollektiven Verhandlungsprozesse – die in den meisten Fällen von Gewerkschaften initiiert sind – Verzerrungen am Arbeitsmarkt hervorrufen. Dies liegt vorrangig darin begründet, dass Gewerkschaften ihre Marktmacht dazu nutzen, um den Lohn ihrer Mitglieder über sein markträumendes Niveau zu heben. Allerdings herrscht auch unter Ökonomen keine eindeutige Meinung darüber, inwiefern diese Verzerrungen von der Größe der Gewerkschaft, ihren verfolgten Zielen oder auch von dem Zusammenspiel mit anderen institutionellen Faktoren abhängen. An diesem Punkt setzt die Arbeit von Marcus Dittrich an. Insbesondere untersucht der Autor den Zusammenhang zwischen Zentralisierungsgrad der Lohnverhandlungen, Machtverteilung zwischen den Tarifparteien, Zielen bzw. Konflikten innerhalb der Arbeitnehmervertretungen sowie staatlichen Eingriffen in den Lohnfindungsmechanismus und dem Arbeitsmarktergebnis in Form von Lohnhöhe und -struktur, von Beschäftigung und gesamtgesellschaftlicher Wohlfahrt. Er greift mit seiner theoretischen Analyse bedeutende Kontroversen in der Literatur zur Arbeitsmarktökonomik auf, deren aktueller wirtschaftspolitischer Stellenwert exemplarisch anhand des aktuellen Diskurses um Mindestlohnregelungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unterstrichen wird.
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich

Union wage setting in a dual labour market: The role of centralisation.

In: International Economic Journal vol. 22 pg. 461-470

  • (2008)
Journal article
  • M. Berlemann
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • G. Markwardt

The value of non-binding announcements in public goods experiments: Some theory and experimental evidence.

In: Journal of Socio-Economics vol. 38 pg. 421-428

  • (2009)
Contribution
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • K. Leipold

Public-Goods-Experimente: Stand der ökonomischen Forschung und gesellschaftspolitische Implikationen.

In: Geist und Gesellschaft. Politische und wissenschaftliche Analysen pg. 25-32

  • Eds.:
  • A. Seemüller
  • M. Dresler

Hirzel Stuttgart

  • (2009)
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich

Welfare effects of local versus central wage bargaining.

In: LABOUR vol. 24 pg. 24-36

  • (2010)
InternetDocument
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • A. Knabe

Warum selbst niedrige Mindestlöhne schädlich sein können.

KOF Konjunkturforschungsstelle der ETH Zürich

  • (2010)

Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich

Minimum wages and unemployment benefits in a unionised economy: A game-theoretic approach.

In: Annals of Economics and Finance vol. 11 pg. 209-229

  • (2010)
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich

Martin Myant/Jan Drahokoupil (2010): Transition economies: Political economy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia (Book Review).

In: Journal for East European Management Studies vol. 16 pg. 185-186

  • (2011)
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • B. Schirwitz

Union membership and employment dynamics: A note.

In: Economics Letters vol. 110 pg. 38-40

  • (2011)
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • B. Schirwitz

Unions - the bigger, the worse? Centralization and the scope of bargaining.

In: Journal of Economic Research vol. 16 pg. 231-255

  • (2011)
Contribution
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • B. Schirwitz

Union membership, employment dynamics and bargaining structure (Chapter 5).

In: Labour markets at a crossroads. Causes of change, challenges and need to reform pg. 147-160

  • Eds.:
  • N. Karlson
  • H. Lindberg

Cambridge Scholars Pub. Newcastle upon Tyne

  • (2012)
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • A. Knabe

Spillover effects of minimum wages under union wage bargaining.

In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics vol. 169 pg. 506-518

  • (2013)
Journal article
  • K. Leipold
  • N. Vetter
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • M. Lehmann-Waffenschmidt
  • M. Kliegel

Individual and developmental differences in the relationship between preferences and theory of mind.

In: Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics vol. 6 pg. 236-251

  • (2013)

Lecture
  • A. Akkemik
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • K. Göksal
  • K. Leipold
  • M. Ogaki

Worldviews and altruistic economic behaviour: Empirical evidence for Germany. Paper No. 823.

In: 53rd ERSA Congress (Regional Integration: Europe, the Mediterranean and the World Economy)

European Regional Science Association Palermo, Italien

  • 27.-31.08.2013 (2013)
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • A. Knabe
  • K. Leipold

Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence.

In: CESifo Economic Studies vol. 60 pg. 780-804

  • (2014)

Book
  • D. Gesmann-Nuissl
  • R. Hartz
  • Marcus Dittrich

Perspektiven der Wirtschaftswissenschaften.

Springer Gabler

  • (2014)
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • K. Leipold

Gender differences in time preferences.

In: Economics Letters vol. 122 pg. 413-415

  • (2014)

Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • A. Knabe
  • K. Leipold

Gender differences in experimental wage negotations.

In: Economic Inquiry vol. 52 pg. 862-873

  • (2014)

Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • B. Mey

Are people satisfied with their time use?. Empirical evidence from German survey data.

In: Economics Bulletin vol. 35 pg. 2903-2914

  • (2015)

show abstract

Using data from the German Time Use Survey, we examine how people allocate their time and how satisfied people are with their time use. Our results suggest that people are more satisfied with the time spent on work and work-related activities than with the time spent on leisure, family, and friends. Moreover, we find that non-employed individuals are more satisfied with their time spent on private and leisure activities than employed individuals. Exploring the factors that affect overall time use satisfaction, we find - among significant age and gender effects - a much more positive effect of time spent on various leisure activities for employed than for non-employed individuals.
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich

Gender differences in trust and reciprocity: Evidence from a large-scale experiment with heterogenous subjects.

In: Applied Economics vol. 47 pg. 3825-3838

  • (2015)

DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2015.1019036

show abstract

This article examines gender differences in an experimental trust game. Recent studies have shown that men trust more and that women are more reciprocal in laboratory experiments. Participants in these studies, however, are typically university students who may not be representative of the entire population. In this study, we use data from a large-scale experiment with heterogeneous subjects who are representative of the German population. We find that men exhibit not only more trusting behaviour, but also more reciprocating behaviour than women. Moreover, our results are indicative of age-dependent gender differences. For men, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between age, on the one hand, and both trust and reciprocity, on the other; however, we do not find age effects for women.
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • B. Mey

Gender differences in volunteer activities: Evidence from German survey data.

In: Economics Bulletin vol. 35 pg. 349-360

  • (2015)

show abstract

In this study, we examine the gender differences in formal and informal volunteering using data from a Time Use Survey in Germany. Our study finds strong evidence that women are more likely to volunteer formally if they also volunteer informally, suggesting that the decisions are complementary. However, for men the decisions to volunteer formally and informally are not significantly related. Moreover, we find that gender differences in labour force participation cannot explain our results.
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • S. Städter

Moral hazard and bargaining over incentive contracts.

In: Research in Economics vol. 69 pg. 75-85

  • (2015)

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2014.10.002

show abstract

This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker׳s effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution depends on the agents׳ bargaining power. The social planner can mitigate inefficiencies arising in both bargaining solutions from the moral hazard problem and even achieve the first-best outcome by allocating the agents׳ bargaining power. If raising the worker׳s bargaining power is necessary to achieve the first-best solution, this increase must be higher in the Nash solution than in the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution.
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich

Union membership and employment dynamics: The role of the union objective function.

In: Theoretical Economics Letters vol. 9 pg. 1473-1479

  • (2019)

DOI: 10.4236/tel.2019.95094

show abstract

This paper studies the behaviour of a labour union in a model with employment and membership dynamics. It is known from the literature that the relative level of employment between intertemporal and static union models is affected by the structure of the union density function. We show that this result does not hold in general but rather that it depends on the union objective function. If the union maximises the wage bill of their members, employment in the intertemporal model will differ from employment in the static model depending on the union density function. However, if the union maximises the rent from unionisation, the intertemporal model will yield the same level of employment as the static model regardless of the union density.
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • S. Städter

Monitoring 'lemons': Why lower productivity workers are sometimes monitored more closely.

In: Applied Economics Letters vol. 28 pg. 737-741

  • (2021)

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2020.1776826

show abstract

We analyse workplace monitoring in a principal–agent model with two types of workers who differ in their productivity. The firm decides on the effort level, the wage and the monitoring intensity for both workers. We find that the elasticities of the workers’ effort-cost function and the firm’s monitoring-cost function affect the firm’s monitoring intensity. Our results imply that the firm might monitor the low-productive worker more closely than the high-productive worker.
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • B. Mey

Giving time or giving money? On the relationship between charitable contributions.

In: Journal of Economic Psychology vol. 85 pg. 102396

  • (2021)

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2021.102396

show abstract

This paper studies philanthropic behaviour in terms of money and time contributions for charitable organisations. Using a unique dataset, which is representative of the German population, we examine the pure contributions of individuals who give either money or time as well as joint contributions of individuals who give both money and time. We find that the sequential decisions to give to charity and how much to give can be explained by different socio-economic characteristics. We report particularly pronounced gender differences among pure contributions, an interesting pattern of human capital variables such as income and education, and possible differences in the type of philanthropic goods.
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • B. Mey

Time Use Choices and Volunteer Labour Supply.

In: VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations vol. 32 pg. 1299–1320

  • 24.10.2019 (2021)

DOI: 10.1007/s11266-019-00179-4

show abstract

This paper examines time allocation and satisfaction with time use of volunteers and non-volunteers. Using data from the German Time Use Survey, we find that volunteers spend more time on work-related activities. Moreover, time use choices are associated with women’s propensity to volunteer and men’s satisfaction with time use, which is a proxy for individual well-being. Controlling for possible endogeneity of volunteering, our results suggest that volunteering needs to be treated as endogenous for women, while volunteering is an exogenous and positive predictor for men’s time use satisfaction.
Contribution
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • S. Städter

Regulierung von Managergehältern - ein spieltheoretischer Ansatz.

In: Kapital in Recht und Wirtschaft. Festschrift der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften der TU Chemnitz für Ludwig Gramlich zum 70. Geburtstag (Studien zum Öffentlichen Wirtschaftsrecht) pg. 217-224

  • Eds.:
  • D. Gesmann-Nuissl
  • S. Korte

Cuvillier Verlag Göttingen

  • (2021)
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • S. Städter

Regulating executive pay: Incentive contracts and non-binding bonus caps.

In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) vol. 177 pg. 81-96

  • (2021)

DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0045

show abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of a regulatory cap on executive pay. We use a principal-agent model with moral hazard in which a firm and a manager bargain over an incentive contract, and we discuss the consequences of a nonbinding cap on bonus payments. We find that the bonus cap negatively affects the manager's effort choice and social welfare, even if the cap is introduced at a nonbinding level.
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich

Wage bargaining and minimum wages in a search-matching model.

In: International Game Theory Review vol. 27 October 2021

  • (2021)

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500049

show abstract

In this paper, we analyze the introduction of a nonbinding minimum wage in a search–matching model with wage bargaining. Applying the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution instead of the commonly applied Nash solution, we provide a theoretical explanation for spillover effects of minimum wages on other wages higher up in the wage distribution. The labor market equilibrium in the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution with a minimum wage is characterized by lower market tightness, a higher unemployment rate, and lower vacancy rate than the equilibrium in the Nash solution. Moreover, we show that a nonbinding minimum wage can increase social welfare.
Journal article
  • Marcus Dittrich
  • B. Mey

Voluntary labour supply by birth cohort: empirical evidence from Germany.

In: Empirica

  • (2023)

DOI: 10.1007/s10663-023-09573-0

show abstract

This paper examines the relationship between the volunteer labour supply as a component of social capital accumulation and birth cohorts. Using cross-sectional data from Germany, we apply pseudo time series and panel methods to study the connection between volunteering, active membership status, and public and private good motivations to capture an apparently changing perception of volunteer work. Our results suggest that volunteering establishes itself as a stable behaviour. Active membership and motives to volunteer to do something for a common good have predictive power. The results suggest that the volunteer labour supply is associated with some kind of institutionalised structures and a public good orientation rather than ‘just having a good time’.

core competencies

  • Applied Microeconomics
  • Behavioural Economics
  • Game Theory
  • Labour Economics

Other

CESifo Research Network Fellow

Research and Publications: https://sites.google.com/view/mdittrich